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Abstract 
Niger has been poorly served by its formal rural financial system. The Caisse 
Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA) has incurred substantial losses through high transac-
tion costs however its formal accounting procedures disguise this poor performance. It's role 
was little more than a conduit to supply inputs. Other properties of financial intermediation 
were ignored and counterproductive centralized targeting was rampant. Total transaction 
costs of the system were shown to be quite high and financial viability impossible in the 
current organization. Necessary organizational reforms to achieve viability are discussed. 
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Introduction 
The efficiency with which financial markets operate determines the magnitude of 
their contribution to economic development. Financial intermediaries mobilize funds from 
savers and make them available to investors. All transactions between these participants 
in the financial system involve explicit prices (interest rates) and non-interest transaction 
costs. The higher these costs, the less efficient the performance of financial markets. 
Intermediation costs are particularly high in the development banks that operate in 
the rural areas of developing economies (Cuevas, 1988). The absence of appropriate means 
of transportation and communication increases the costs incurred by lenders and borrowers. 
Regulations and complicated loan procedures, associated with selective credit policies, 
further augment these costs. Even in the absence of cumbersome loan-targeting schemes, 
the operation of a conventional credit system implies high transaction costs for all partici-
pants in the loan contract. 
The conventional loan process requires the use of real resources, for activities that 
can be classified into four groups: 
1 The authors acknowledge the support of the USAID Mission in Niger. Kifle Negash 
and Michel Keita were essential in the collection of the data supporting the findings 
reported here. The kind cooperation of Abdou Isaka, General Manager of the 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole, is gratefully appreciated. 
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(a) Evaluation and analysis of loan applications 
This stage comprises the gathering of information about the loan applicant, 
the assessing of the value of collateral, and/ or the evaluation of the invest-
ment opportunities available to the prospective borrower, in order to establish 
his creditworthiness. 
(b) Loan disbursement 
This involves making the loan available to the borrower, in cash or in kind, 
and recording and documenting the transaction. 
( c) Monitorini 
This stage implies obtaining information about the performance of the 
borrower's investment. Monitoring is more important when loans are dis-
bursed in several tranches, over an extended period of time. Technical 
assistance and supervision may be components of this stage. 
( d) Repayment 
The last step is loan recovery. A well defined collection strategy is essential 
to attain financial viability and protect the loan portfolio. 
None of these activities is, by itself, sufficient to guarantee good performance. Loan 
evaluation and recovery may be the two most critical stages, but good record-keeping and 
mointoring are still necessary to obtain satisfactory results. All four steps generate transac-
tion costs for the borrower, as well. In a conventional credit system, the borrower must fill 
out forms and supply documents with the loan application. Several trips to the bank may 
be necessary, in addition, during the negotiation, disbursement, and repayment stages. f 
J 
I 
3 
This chapter critically evaluates major features of the rural credit system of Niger. 
The nature and main components of the rural credit network are discussed first, with 
emphasis on the truncated role played by formal financial institutions. Next, the characteris-
tics and performance of the key rural credit institution, the Caisse Nationale de Credit 
Agricole (CNCA), are described and analyzed. Finally, the magnitude and distribution of 
transaction costs in the credit network are documented, while the disporportionate share of 
these costs borne by the institutions is highlighted. Concluding remarks and implications 
follow. 
. The Rural Credit System of Niger 
The major participants in the Niger rural credit system are: 
(a) the individual borrowers at the village level; 
(b) the groupements mutualistes (GMs) and cooperatives2; and 
(c) two institutions, the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA), and the 
Union Nationale de Cooperatives (UNC)3• The CNCA is the lending institu-
tion, whereas the UNC deals directly with the cooperatives and GMs at the 
village level. 
Institutional rural finance in Niger is incomplete in two very important ways. First, 
even though rural savings exist, they are not mobilized by the institution lending to agricul-
2 The GMs are village-level groups that comprise a cooperative. 
3 The institution dealing with input supply, the Centrale d'Approvisionnement, plays an 
important role in the input delivery process, but it is not considered here as part of 
the credit network. 
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ture. Instead, this institution relies exclusively upon government funds and external donor 
support. Second, the institutional credit network dealing with agriculture does not operate 
as a conventional and well-established credit system. 
Of the four stages of the loan procedure, loan disbursement is probably the only 
phase that could be considered in place. However, even key record-keeping practices 
associated with disbursement are deficient. Evaluation and analysis of loan applicantions 
do not exist, and there are not systematic loan recovery efforts. In-kind loans are allocated 
among cooperatives, amonggroupements mutualistes, and among individual borrowers based 
on criteria that do not consider creditworthiness. This is partially due to the lack of 
appropriate records and of sufficiently trained personnel to engage in this activity. 
Three major implications of the underdevelopment of the institutional credit system 
in Niger can be outlined. First, the system does not and cannot perform any meaningful 
resource allocation role through financial intermediation. Second, the system does not 
provide the financial intermediary with instruments of credit rationing in the presence of 
fixed interest-rate ceilings prevailing in Niger. Third, as a loan delivery system, the credit 
network of Niger should be a low cost operation. Existing procedures are simple and 
institutional resources are scarce; the transaction costs associated with the system would be 
expected to be low. This, however, should not be interpreted as an indicator of efficiency. 
Rather, these costs are merely a measure of the resources involved in operating an input 
delivery system, without the key components and functions of a complete credit system. 
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The Caisse Nationale de Cr~dit Agricole: History and Performance 
For almost 20 year~, the CNCA has carried out the function of channeling funds, for 
the most part indirectly through parastatal organizations, towards the rural sector. It was 
created as a division of the Union Nationale de Credit et de Cooperation (UNCC). The 
UNCC had been established to provide greater central control over cooperatives and 
through time had taken on a variety of functions, from input supply to credit distribu-
tion,peanut marketing, seed distribution, the management of development projects, coopera-
tive education, farmer training, functional literacy, supplying products of primary necessity, 
and distributing grain in times of scarcity. 
Some of these functions were subsequently transferred to other specialized parastatal 
agencies, as in the case of the grain marketing agency, the Office des Produits Vivriers du 
Niger (OPVN), establishea in 1970; the Office National de Amenagements Hydro-Agricoles 
(ONAHA), the irrigation authority established in 1978; or to specialized services still within 
the UNCC, such as the Centrale d'Approvisionnement (CA), the input supply agency, created 
in 1978; and the Ateliers de Fabrication de Materiel Agricole (the agricultural equipment 
workshops). 
When the credit function was passed over to the CNCA, strong links were main-
tained. By law, the chairman and members of the board of the UNCC were respectively the 
chairman and members of the board of the CNCA The representative of each agency at 
the regional level was one and the same until 1980, when the government took a firmer 
stand in trying to set up the CNCA as a full-fledged agricultural credit institution. 
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The CNCA continues to rely heavily on the parastatal agencies, both as a device for 
indirectly channeling credit to farmers, and to perform critical functions in identifying, 
selecting, and monitoring its final direct borrowers, that is, the farmers in the village 
Groupements Mutualistes (GMs). Several of these separate village level GMs make up the 
multi-village cooperatives. Transferring the credit function to the CNCA did not automati-
cally create the necessary banking skills nor were the extension and follow-up skills of the 
parastatal agencies improved. On the contrary, incentives were created that made the 
situation worse on both fronts. 
The CNCA, trapped by its own mission, could not afford to establish contact with 
many of its farmer borrowers in the rural areas. Working through other institutions to reach 
them reduced its chances of learning how to effectively perform its own banking functions. 
In particular, it could not develop direct bank-customer relationships. 
From the point of yiew of learning processes within the CNCA, the situation wors-
ened when large-scale Productivity Projects entered the scene. The predefined goals and 
prescriptions embedded in these programs erected a strong barrier to any attempt by an 
external institution, such as the CNCA, to understand and much less participate in the loan 
evaluation and loan administration activity where these projects operated. In short, the 
CNCA became a mere conduit to channel funds, rather than an active participant in the 
decision-making process of assessing the risk and creditworthiness of potential clients. 
The agents of the parastatal agencies and the productivity projects, on the other 
hand, found in this situation incentives to reduce the quality of their own performance, both 
with regard to the support services offered to the CNCA and in their own operations. First, 
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the transfer of loans from their books to the CNCA obviously reduced their motivation in 
assessing creditworthiness and loan collection on behalf of the CNCA Second, the opportu-
nity to influence credit allocation and loan repayment created a situation in which the 
negative effects of their Qwn, possibly inappropriate, technological advice and even fraud 
could be temporarily covered up with resources borrowed directly by them or by their 
project farmers. The disbursement of these loans could mitigate the losses growing out of 
poor research and extension efforts and reduce the complaints of the farmer-borrowers, as 
they were not asked to repay. In short, as long as the loan program is labelled experimental 
and the experiment proves deficient, parastatal agencies and the productivity projects can 
save face with their farmer-borrowers by not pushing aggressively for loan repayment. 
Thus, recourse by the CNCA to draw in the parastatals and projects for supporting 
services in credit delivery and loan repayment can paradoxically create incentives and 
opportunities for the same entities to work against rather than in support of loan repayment. 
This is to be expected when an entity that is essentially a wholesale borrower (i.e., the 
parastatal), also assumes a retail role as a credit officer and loan collection agent for its 
creditor, (i.e., the CNCA). The conflicts of interest inherent in these split roles weaken and 
eventually destroy rigorous loan management and loan recovery practices. The CNCA is 
left defenseless in this system in which the farmer borrowers are expected to repay the field 
level parastatal extension agents who in turn are expected to repay the CNCA 
In this framework, the financial institution is not considered intrinsically useful in its 
own right, but rather a mere administrative device, completely subordinated to the purpose 
of channeling credit for predefined targeted uses. These uses are not chosen by the lender 
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or the borrowers, but by a development agency whose task is to stimulate the adoption of 
specific technologies or practices. Such an approach does not provide the incentives to 
develop, within the financial institution, the managerial and banking skills needed to 
administer a loan portfolio and develop a healthy bank-client relationship. 
Liability Mana~ement: Instability and Vulnerability 
The evolution of the liabilities of the CNCA is reported in Table 1, which identifies 
the large share of total funds borrowed through the government and foreign donors. The 
variability of the rate of growth of these liabilities is substantial. This extreme instability 
and lack of diversification of funding sources grows out of the instability (i.e. feast or famine 
syndrome) of donor and government funding thereby affecting the overall rate of growth of 
the institution. 
The Central Bank's rediscount lines on average accounted for about 45 percent of 
total CNCA borrowing ov~r the period, while fixed-term deposits (mostly from the Treasury) 
and external lines of credit from international donors, under very soft conditions, accounted 
for 23 and 20 percent respectively. At the end of 1983-84, these three sources accounted for 
91 percent of the CNCA's borrowed funds. 
This composition of borrowed funds does not stimulate the development of the skills 
and procedures required to approach the general public for deposit mobilization. Nor does 
the CNCA benefit from the incentives that dealing with regular depositors creates for the 
improvement of banking skills and other procedures, such as effective loan evaluation and 
risk analysis, liquidity and cash management, and loan recovery practices. 
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In summary, when the structure of liabilities of a financial institution is dominated 
by government rediscount lines of credit or international donor funds, the institution 
becomes bo"ower-dominated. Namely, all the loan procedures and administrative practices 
are designed to favor the borrower's interest. Detailed farm budget studies and targeted 
clientele are emphasized (to introduce new technology or increase output), while rigorous 
creditworthiness analyses and loan recovery procedures are minimized. In short the 
institution loses its autonomy to shape its portfolio to secure viability. 
In contrast, when the liability structure is dominated by deposits from the public, the 
institution becomes depositor-dominated in its operational philosophy. Loan management 
and administrative procedures are designed to favor and protect depositors' interests. High-
cost loan-targeting programs are minimized, while loan evaluation and creditworthiness 
analyses are emphasized. At the same time, loan collection procedures are highlighted and 
recovery efforts are aggressively pursued. · 
Borrower-dominated institutions frequently expenence severe difficulties, since 
financial viability is not a dominant priority. Depositor-dominated institutions, on the other 
hand, are usually more solvent, since the survival of the institution is important for deposi-
tors and viability becomes a dominant feature of managerial strategy. The structure of the 
liabilities of the CNCA makes it a classic example of a borrower-dominated institution, 
dependent upon government and donor funds, with all the weaknesses associated with this 
form of dependency. 
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Asset Management: Portfolio Structure and Performance 
The portfolio of financial assets of the CNCA (99 percent of which consists of loans 
and overdrafts) recorded an average annual growth of 17.6 percent over the period 1979/80 
- 1983 /84 (Table 2). This compares to an annual rate of inflation of 10.2 percent over the 
same time period (GNP deflator). The rate of growth over the same period, excluding 
doubtful loans, was 16.9 percent for overdrafts, 23.1 percent for short-term loans, and 25.7 
percent for medium-term loans. The rates of growth for each type of loan are extremely 
. 
variable over time, because of unstable seasonality coupled with end-of-period data, and of 
the very high concentration of borrowing entities. 
Abrupt shifts in program funding through government and international sources 
introduces equally abrupt shifts in assets. Starting in 1983/84 and continuing in 1984/85, 
Table 2 shows a negative rate of change for all types of loans as donors reduced their 
previous rate of funding and the government reduced its capital subscriptions in these years 
of world recession affecting government uranium export earnings and tax revenues. These 
rapid shifts in liabilities and assets complicate loan management practices and compromise 
efficient loan recovery. Farm-borrowers (or cooperatives) are not inclined to repay loans 
to an institution that is experiencing abrupt funding problems, since the reward for repaying 
a loan (i.e., getting a new loan) appears unlikely. Thus, a growing image of instability in 
funding sources will induce a rising rate of loan delinquency. 
Over two-thirds of the CNCA loan portfolio consists of overdrafts and short-term 
loans, less than one third is comprised of medium-term loans. Overdrafts fall into five main 
groups (Table 3). Crop loans consisted mostly of loans to the OPVN, the grain marketing 
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agency, and to a lesser extent to Riz du Niger and SONARA (rice and peanut marketing 
parastatals). Input supply loans went mostly to the Central d'Approvisionnement. Pre-
financing loans were mainly for Productivity Projects (i.e., credit granted as an advance on 
the expected disbursement of lines of credit from external donors or the Fonds National 
d'lnvestissement). Advances went to the ONAHA directly and to some irrigation projects, 
while other advances on current account were for Productivity Projects. 
Medium-term loans accounted for 46 percent of the number and 28 percent of the 
value of total loans outstanding at the end of 1984/85. An important, although decreasing, 
proportion of these loans is accounted for by the consolidation of loans granted to crop 
marketing agencies, such as the OPVN, SONARA, Riz du Niger, and by a non-interest loan 
granted to the Government. The rest of the medium-term portfolio is represented by loans 
to cooperatives and to individuals (65 percent and 16.5 percent,respectively, at the end of 
1984/85). The main use of the loans in the case of cooperatives is the acquisition of 
collective farm equipment, especially within the Productivity Projects. Other stated purposes 
for individual loans are preparation and planting of orchards, cattle herd reconstitution, and 
seed storage (mainly for groundnuts). 
The build-up of retail lending by the CNCA, i.e., loans directly granted to coopera-
tives and individuals, is concentrated in short- and medium-term loans, but the proportion 
of these loans to the total value outstanding is insignificant, except for medium-term credit 
to cooperatives. The average amount per loan is so low, expecially for short-term loans, that 
it is difficult to assume that the net interest margin is sufficient to cover operating costs. 
If, for example, the cost of funds is assumed to be equal to the preferential rediscount rate, 
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this margin is fixed at 2.5 percent, inclusive of commissions, for all loans to cooperatives. 
This means CFA 2,500 annually on a loan for CFA 100,000, which represents a cost of about 
3 man/hours of work time valued at the average cost of personnel for the CNCA. Clearly, 
more time is spent in processing these loans, even in the imperfect loan delivery system 
within the CNCA and its associated parastatal institutions. A larger interest rate margin to 
cover these operational costs and risks is clearly in order. 
The quality of the loan portfolio of the CNCA has been steadily deteriorating over 
the years. The CNCA reports as doubtful only those loans granted to individuals and 
cooperatives. All loans granted to or guaranteed by the Government are by law unable to 
be classified in default, therefore no loan loss provisions have been made for parastatal 
agencies, although many of these loans are clearly non-performing. The data for doubtful 
loans reported in Table 3 ref er therefore only to loans for cooperatives and individuals. The 
CNCA considered 100 percent of the short-term credit to cooperatives and 50 percent of 
the short and medium-term credit to individuals as "not recoverable." If we accept, for the 
moment, this unrealistically narrow definition of non-performing loans, only 8.7 percent of 
the total loan portfolio was considered doubtful, and adjusted accordingly with increased loss 
provisions at the end of 1984-85. An alternative, more realistic, appraisal of the importance 
of doubtful loans would consider a substantial portion of the loans to government parastatals 
as equally doubtful. Thus, the misleadingly low 8.7 percent default estimate in Table 3 
could be very easily adjusted upwards to represent a substantial majority of the total 
portfolio. 
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In this situation, the stability of the institution is undermined in many ways. On the 
one hand, the absence of loan turnover creates great liquidity shortages for the CNCA 
while, on the other hand, profitability is at stake both because of the increased cost of funds 
prompted by the liquidity crisis and due to the lost interest income and the loss in the value 
of assets. These effects can only be hidden partially by accounting practices. 
Profitability 
The assessment of the CNCA's profitability depends critically on judgements concern-
ing the actual value of its assets and of accrued interest. Data on revenues, costs, and profit 
margins are set forth in Table 4. Positive net profit and profit margins are evident through-
out the period. These data could be taken at face value only if one had confidence in the 
data recorded as income from financial operations and provisions for loan losses, but 
unfortunately this is not the case. 
Extraordinary items are related to the need to take into consideration profits and 
losses that escaped appropriate reporting in previous accounting periods. This reflects the 
difficulty of measuring the performance of the CNCA. Relevant factors increasing these 
items are the inefficienty of the CNCA's information system and the dispute surrounding the 
relationship between the CNCA and some of its important parastatal clients. 
In summary, declining profits in recent years reflect the deterioration of the CNCA's 
portfolio. These findings are, in any case, greatly misleading, since actual profits (in contrast 
to accounting profits) are clearly non-existent. Estimates of "income from financial opera-
tions" are based on "accrued" interest, a conventional accounting term that considers all the 
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hypothetical (not necessarily paid) interest earnings as revenue. If, instead, one used 
interest payments actually received to estimate revenue, the CN CA would record losses 
instead of profits, and the trends noted above would document increasing losses rather than 
declining profits. 
Transaction Costs in the Credit Delivery System 
The assessment of the transaction costs associated with the CNCA credit network is 
undertaken at three levels: 
(a) the individU;al borrower or household level, 
(b) the leaders of GMs and cooperatives, and 
(c) the UNC and the CNCA at their different levels of operation. 
The magnitudes of transaction costs for all three levels are summarized in Table 5. 
Transaction Costs of Borrowing at the Household Level 
The findings reported in this section are based on a field survey undertaken in July-
August, 1985. The sample included 900 households throughout different regions of Niger. 
There were two predominant types of loans among the sample of 482 borrowers from 
institutions4: equipment loans, with an average amount close to 132, 000 CF A, and seed 
4 This sample of institutional borrowers is comprised by all interviews in the overall 
sample of 900 households that had received a loan in the five-year period preceding 
the date of the survey. A detailed description of the sample is included in Graham, 
Cuevas, and Negash (1986). 
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loans, averaging about 1,000 CFA5• The results discussed below refer to equipment loans, 
since seed loans consisted primarily of aid in kind, distributed with minimum formalities. 
Loan procedures were in general very simple for individual borrowers. There were 
not collateral requirements, but equipment loans would typically require a contribution or 
downpayment by the beneficiary. The loan was usually proposed or suggested to the 
borrower by someone else (i.e., a UNC agent or cooperative official), rather than an 
outgrowth of the borrower's own initiative. 
In a large majority of the cases, the equipment and inputs had been received on time, 
and in satisfactory conditi?n. An important shortcoming of the input delivery process was, 
however, the lack of knowledge for the correct use of the inputs received. Furthermore, 
only 50 percent of these farmers acknowledged having received some training in the use of 
the equipment and tools obtained as in-kind credit. 
Over one-third of all the borrowers admitted to being delinquent in their payments. 
Among borrowers of equipment loans, 53 percent admitted to a delinquent status. Insuffi-
cient revenue was the most frequently cited reason for non-repayment. Another important 
explanation was the lack of recovery efforts on the part of the credit institution. 
In summary, the loan procedure can be characterized as a relatively expeditious 
delivery system of credit in-kind. The major shortcomings are insufficient training and 
technical assistance for the borrowers, and poor loan recovery. The leaders of cooperatives 
-
and GMs appear to play an important role throughout the process. They seem to concen-
trate their efforts, however, on the disbursement stage, neglecting the repayment function. 
5 1 US$ = 330 CPA 
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Even though all farmers are in principle members of a GM (hence, of a cooperative), 
the group itself does not perform a clear role in the operation of the system. There is no 
collective responsibility for the loans received, nor group pressure to repay or group support 
for those in arrears. The GM appears to operate primarily as a convenient group and locale 
to communicate the availability of credit and collect the names of interested villagers. 
These functions will certainly reduce transaction costs of borrowing, but will not improve 
the efficiency of the system as a resource allocation mechanism. 
The measurement of transaction costs of borrowing at the household level considered 
two major components: . 
(a) explicit travel expenses to apply for and negotiate the loan, receive the 
disbursements, and repay the loan, and; 
(b) the opportunity cost of the time spent in performing the activities involved in 
the different steps of the loan procedure. The opportunity cost of time was 
valued at 514 CFA per day6• 
The transaction costs of borrowing for individual farmers are reported in Table 5. 
These costs are low by most standards. One percent of the amount of the loan represents 
less than one-tenth of the usual interest rates charged on loans (11-13 percent). Studies 
conducted in other developing economies have found transaction costs equivalent to at least 
30 percent of the explicit interest rate, and as high as twice the level of the lending rate. 
As suggested earlier, these low cost levels reflect the incipient development of the credit 
6 Estimated value added per day per active person, based on the figures of rural GDP 
per capita reported in Cuevas (1987), the proportion of active population derived 
from the 1977 census, and an estimated ratio of value added to GDP of 0.6. 
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system, rather than a highly efficient operation. Most of these costs are generated at the 
disbursement stage, a finding that reinforces the impression that the Niger credit network 
performs primarily an input delivery function. 
Transaction Costs at the GM and Cooperative Level 
This section relies upon data obtained in interviews with the leadership of 24 
cooperatives and 73 groupements mutualistes (GM) carried out in January-February, 1986. 
According to these interviews, the responsibility of allocating credit among individuals was 
shared by the leaders of the GMs and of the cooperatives, and by the representatives of the 
UNC. The CNCA, i.e., the lending institution, was perceived as playing a major role in 
these decisions in only 7 percent of the cases. Numerous criteria were indicated for 
allocating credit to the individual beneficiaries. Most frequently cited by GM and coopera-
tive leaders were the individual's ability to repay, in line with their rank order in the list of 
applicants, and their ability to provide a deposit (caution). 
Less than half of the leaders interviewed were in possession of records indicating who 
was eligible for a loan among the members of the group. Only 18 percent had records or 
documentation indicating the amounts received by each farmer. These findings, consistent 
with the level of literacy documented in the survey, suggest that records about eligibility for 
credit and loan disbursements are kept in memorized form by the leaders of the organiza-
tions, rather than in written form. 
The distribution of responsibilites in loan recovery were not clear. Most cooperative 
leaders felt that recovery was a role to be performed by the UNC official, whereas GM 
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leaders attributed this function to the cooperative leaders. Basic information for loan 
recovery, i.e., debt records, existed in only one-half of the cases. 
The characteristics of the loan process at the GM and cooperative levels outlined 
above reinforce the notion that this credit network operates primarily as an input delivery 
channel. Input distribution appears to be performed with relative efficiency. The system 
fails in the areas of loan-allocation decisions, documentation of debts, and loan recovery. 
In all these areas, responsibilities and roles are not clearly assigned, and essential records 
and documentation are absent or deficient. It is not surprising then that the costs of 
operating the system at this level are minimal, as shown in Table 5. 
Overall, the low costs per CFA borrowed demonstrate the advantages of group 
borrowing, i.e., of handling large (multiple) loans through the common leadership of the 
organization. The low cost per loan, however, also indicates the lack of sophistication of 
the loan procedure. At the same time, it reflects weak loan allocation practices, poor 
documentation of disbursements, and deficient loan recovery procedures. 
Operational Costs of Lending at the Institutional Level 
The field survey undertaken in January-February, 1986 included interviews with 14 
officials of the UNC and 5 CNCA branch managers. UNC officials devoted less than half 
their time to credit-related activities, whereas CNCA personnel, as expected, were dedicated 
exclusively to credit functions. These differences in the allocation of time were taken into 
account to compute the costs associated with credit activities. 
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Table 5 shows that the institutions in question bear a large proportion of the costs 
associated with the credit delivery system. The CNCA alone shows operational costs per 
cooperative in the portfolio equivalent to 5.44 percent of the average loan amount per 
cooperative. The UNC activity at the arrondissement level also results in rather substantial 
operational costs of lending. 
It must be noted that the costs reported do not include expenses incurred at the 
central offices of the UNC and the CNCA. This implies that those costs will underestimate 
the total transaction costs of operating the credit delivery system. Given the distribution of 
personnel of the CNCA between the central office (43 percent) and the branches (57 
percent), one could assu~e an overhead of about 75 percent attributable to central-office 
expenses. With this assumption, the CNCA costs per CFA lent increases to 9.52 percent, 
and the combined costs of the CNCA and the UNC rise to almost 12 percent of the 
amounts lent. 
Finally, the costs measured for the CNCA correspond only to the non-interest costs 
of loan administration. These do not include the cost of funds (essentially determined by 
the BCEAO discount rates), or the risk premium (i.e., default cost). The latter reflects the 
effects of default risk on total transaction costs of lending of the institution7• 
7 The risk premium (r) can be defined as: r=[d/(1-d)](l+a+f) where dis the default 
on the loan principal; a is the cost incurred in administering these defaulted loans; 
and f is the cost of funds subsequently lost through default. 
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For the CNCA, the risk premium was estimated at 25.6 percent, using an estimated 
default rate of 18 percent of the CNCA portfolio8, the 9.5 percent administration costs 
reported above, and the preferential discount rate of the BCEAO as the cost of funds at 8 
percent. This still represents a lower-bound estimate, since the default risk associated with 
loans granted to government, public, and semi-public enterprises were not included here. 
With loan administration costs of 9.5 percent and a risk premium of 25.8 percent, 
total transaction costs of lending of the CNCA become 35.3 percent of the amounts lent. 
This is certainly a very high cost of lending, by any standard. This cost must be contrasted 
with the 2.5 percentage point margin allowed to the CNCA and other banks by the BCEAO 
for on-lending. The lending costs of the CNCA exceed this regulated margin by about 33 
percentage points thus the CNCA incurs losses of 33 percent of the amount of loans granted 
every year. 
In summary, even though the credit delivery system of Niger does not include a 
complete set of well-developed banking functions, the resulting costs appear even higher 
than those recorded in other development banks carrying out all these functions. Even 
without devoting sufficient resources to key activities such as loan evaluation and loan 
recovery, the costs of implementing the delivery of inputs to cooperatives and GMs are 
significant. The operations of the CNCA result in an annual loss equivalent to (at least) 33 
percent of the funds lent by this institution. 
8 This default rate does not consider loans to government institutions and parastatals.ls 
since, by law, they cannot be labelled in default despite the fact many of these loans 
are non-performing. 
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Concluding Remarks and Implications 
The deteriorating performance of the CNCA in recent years can be largely traced to 
poor loan management procedures and practices and to an operational philosophy that 
prevents the institution from maturing sufficiently so that it can play a relatively autonomous 
role as a true financial intermediary. The institution has been forced to channel its funds 
to final borrowers on the basis of loan evaluation actions carried out by employees of other 
organizations. It has been compromised, further, in having these same agents of other 
parastatal organizations undertake loan recovery efforts on its behalf. In short, in being 
relegated to a wholesaling role, it has not been able to act as a bank, with its own staff 
acquiring on-site loan evaluation, risk management, and loan recovery skills. 
The instability of funding sources in the structure of liabilities of the CNCA also 
introduces uncertainty into its loan programs and complicates loan administration. With all 
funding coming from international donors or the government's rediscount lines, the CNCA 
has become a borrower-dominated institution. Its organizational framework has created 
incentives for procedures and practices that favor the borrower's interests. Targeting criteria 
to reach selected farmers with new inputs are emphasized, while creditworthiness, risk 
analysis, and loan recovery procedures and efforts are minimized. The financial viability of 
the institution is not an overriding priority. Continual infusions of funds have been needed 
to subsidize the high costs associated with the expensive delivery of loans through an 
incomplete and truncated credit system that inevitably experiences growing default rates. 
Total non-financial costs for all participants in the operation of the CNCA credit 
system are 9.14 percent of the amount of credit channeled from the institution to the 
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individual borrowers. If the estimated central-office costs of the CNCA are included in this 
estimate, total transaction costs per CF A increase to 13.22 percent. The largest share of 
these costs is borne by the participating institutions (86 percent of the total). Credit 
beneficiaries have access to in-kind loans at low transaction costs for them, but the costs 
incurred by the institutions involved are significant. 
This chapter has shown that the institutional agricultural credit system of Niger is for 
the most part limited to the input delivery (credit disbursement) role. Despite the deficien-
cies of key lending practices, the costs of the system are substantial. The major implications 
are, first, that the system in its current state does not and cannot perform a resource 
allocation role through financial intermediation. Second, that the system does not provide 
the financial intermediary with instruments of credit rationing, i.e., risk management, 
autonomous loan evaluation, and overall portfolio management. 
A viable, self sustaining, and efficient financial intermediary would have to reduce 
the currently high level of total transaction costs by altering their composition. Increased 
administrative costs on loan evaluation and effective loan recovery would be necessary to 
reduce the currently high level of defaulted loans. Furthermore, sufficient autonomy from 
centralized targeting schemes is required along with decentralized decision making with 
properly rewarded local mangerial accountability. These branch level managers should have 
the flexibility to hire and fire employees along with the right to reject loans. At the same 
time, portfolio diversification reducing the relative role of high risk production loans and 
increasing commercial and non-agricultural finance would be necessary to smooth out the 
risks and returns to achieve financial viability. Finally a substantial effort in local deposit-
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mobilization is required before any functional autonomy from loan targeting and political 
intrusions can be achieved. Only when these reforms are adopted can a viable formal 
financial intermediary emerge in rural Niger that can offer a self sustaining supply of 
financial services for a rural clientele. 
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Central Bank 
Checking Accounts 
Current Accounts 
Banks and 
Correspondents 
Fixed-Term 
Deposits 
External Lines 
of Credit 
Liabilities 
Central Bank 
Checking Accounts 
Current Accounts 
Banks and 
Correspondents 
Fixed-Term 
Deposits 
External Lines 
of credit 
Total 
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TABLE 1 
Structure and Evolution of 
CNCA Liabilities 1979-80 to 1983-84 
1979-80 
(ll 
1980-81 
( 2) 
1981-82 
( 3) 
1982-83 
(4) 
1983-84 
( 5) 
A. Structural Composition (Percentages) 
42.5 38.3 40.2 54.8 47.9 
2.7 2.6 8.8 5.5 5.4 
1. 7 7.0 3.5 2.7 4.1 
4.9 6.9 4.7 1.3 
30.2 22.6 24.3 17.8 18.9 
17.9 22.6 18.5 17.9 23.7 
B. Annual Rate of Change (Percentages) 
4.0 0.7 15.3 67.5 - 25.2 
208.2 5.8 273.5 - 23.0 
- 15.9 
64.2 352.0 - 45.8 4.7 27.7 
236.6 54.6 - 24.4 - 66.4 -100.0 
126.5 
-
17.5 17.5 9.5 8.9 
270.2 39.0 - 10.3 18.5 13.7 
60.2 10.3 9.7 49.3 14.3 
SOURCE: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84. 
Financial Assets 
Cash, CCP, Central Bank 
Banks & Correspondents 
Overdrafts 
Short-term Loans 
Mediun-term Loans 
Doubtful Loans less 
Provisions 
Total 
Cash, CCP, Central Bank 
Banks & Correspondents 
Overdrafts 
Short-term Loans 
Mediun-term Loans 
Doubtful Loans less 
Provisions 
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TABLE 2 
Structure and Evolution of the Financial Assets of the CNCA 
1978/79 to 1983/84 
1978L79 1979L80 1980L81 1981L82 1982L83 1983L84 
{1l {2l {3l {4l {5l {6l 
A. Annual Rate of Change (Percentages) 
- 57.5 541.0 - 78.0 112.7 - 21.9 
119.6 37.8 - 96.0 284.3 349.5 
37.8 5.5 21.0 36.4 - 16.1 
- 30.6 155.9 - 10.6 14.4 - 13.8 
111.9 18.1 - 0.9 3.5 - 4.0 
29.2 66.2 - 63.9 -100.0 
52.9 13.3 10.8 24.0 - 12.9 
B. Structural Composition (Percentages) 
0.4 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 
0.6 0.9 1.0 0.04 0.1 0.6 
69.7 62.8 58.5 63.9 70.3 67.7 
3.5 1.6 3.6 2.9 2.6 2.6 
24.3 33.7 35.1 31.4 26.2 28.9 
1.5 1.0 1.1 1.6 0.5 
SOURCE: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 and unpublished data in CNCA files for 1984/85. 
.. 
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TABLE 3 
Distribution of Loans by Type of Beneficiary. Te ... Structure. and 
Selected Indicators for the CNCA Credit Portfolio 
1984-85 
Beneficiaries Nunber of Accounts Amount Outstanding Doubtful Loans Doubtful Loans 
~000,000 CFA2 ~000,000 CFA2 ~%2 
Date 30.9.84 30.9.85 30.9.84 30.9.85 30.9.84 30.9.85 30.9.84 30.9.85 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Medium - Term 
Cooperatives 1.160 1.160 2299.4 2531.8 31.4 362.3 1.37 14.31 
OSEMs 5 5 596.3 383.0 
State 1 1 1016.1 338.2 
Individuals 3.219 3.219 665.2 641.0 300.2 298.3 45.13 46.54 
Short - Term 
Cooperatives 1.548 1.548 208.7 256.3 10.8 256.3 5.13 100.00 
Individuals 3.396 3.396 202.0 143.5 74.8 69.7 37.13 48.58 
Overdrafts 
Crop loans 2 1 2522.2 150.9 
Input supply 5 5 2629.0 3430.3 
Prefinancing 16 16 762.9 567.1 
Advances ONAHA and 
AHA 43 43 2072. 7 2390.9 
Other Advances on 
eta 111 111 2164.8 3084.9 189.3 220.0 8.74 _z.....ll 
Total 9506 9505 15199.4 13918.0 606.7 1206.7 3.99 8.67 
SOURCE: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 and unpublished data from CNCA files. 
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TABLE 4 
Revenues, Costs, and Profit Margins for the CHCA 
1978/7 to 1983/4 
(in millions of CFA Francs) 
1978f 79 1979f80 1980l81 1981l82 1982l83 1983f84 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) 
1. Income from 
Financial 
Operations 537.5 1030.8 1281. 5 1664.0 2230.6 1899.5 
2. Charges on 
CNCA Borrowings 282.5 537.9 682.5 1053.6 1486.3 1001. 5 
3. Gross Margin on 
Financial 
Intermediation 255.0 492.9 599.0 610.4 744.3 898.0 
4. Provisions for 
Loan Losses 42.6 80.0 217.9 159.6 222.5 360.8 
5. Net Margin on 
Financial 
Intermediation 212.4 412.9 391.l 450.8 521.8 537.2 
6. Operational 
Costs 165.5 181.4 308.9 291.0 324.9 285.2 
7. Operating 
Margin 46.9 231.5 72.2 159.8 196.9 252.0 
8. Extraordinary 
Items -6.1 -15.0 +78.7 -19.8 +3.7 -65.1 
9. Net Profit 40.8 216.5 150.9 140.0 200.6 186.9 
10. ~~~fit Margin 
7.6 21.0 11.8 8.4 9.0 9.8 
Net profit/Income from financial operations. 
SOURCE: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84. 
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TABLE 5 
Institutional Credit. Summary of Transaction Costs Incurred by 
Different Parti~ipants at Different Levels of the Credit Network 
Level / Participant 
Average Cost 
per Loan 
CFA 
Household Level 
GM Level 
Individual borrower 
GM leaders 
UNC, Arrondissement 
UNC, Department 
Sub-total GM level 
Cooperative Level 
Cooperative leaders 
UNC, Arrondissement 
UNC, Department 
CNCA, Department 
Sub-total cooperative level 
Total Transaction Costs per CFA8 
Summary by participant: 
Individual borrower 
1,120.7 
1,843.2 
2,823.3 
218.4 
4,884.9 
1,969.6 
29,288.7 
2,699.4 
90,238.5 
124,196.2 
GM and cooperative leaders 
Institutions 
UNC 
CNCA 
Source: OSU Surveys, 1985 and 1986. 
Average 
Loan Amount 
CFA 
131,557.0 
604,583.9 
1,659,960.8 
Cost per 
CFA 
' 
0.85 
0.30 
0.47 
0.04 
0.81 
0.12 
1. 76 
0.16 
5.44 
7.48 
9.14 
0.85 
0.42 
2.43 
5.44 
a Does not include costs of the central office of the CNCA. If these are 
considered the total cost per CFA increases to 13.22 percent. 
